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The political institutions of Moroccan tribes are
closely intertwined with the central state. By allying
with state officials, tribe members actively con-
tribute to state authoritarianism. The state has seen
to it that neither the rural council nor the customary
village council offers positions for representation of
the tribal population. However, the recent g o u v e r n e-
ment dÕalternance of Prime Minister Youssoufi and
King Mohammed VI have both declared the introduc-
tion of a local government intended to serve the pop-
ulation, instead of controlling it through this non-
representation. Nonetheless, in view of MoroccoÕs
political culture, it can be argued that this will be a
long-term affair.
Roots of
Moroccan Political
I n s t i t u t i o n s
Since the independence, the political sys-
tem of Morocco can be described as based
on patronage relations. For example, in No-
vember 1988, King Hassan II visited Azrou,
the most important market place of the Beni
Mguild pastoralists in the Middle Atlas, on
his way to his palace in Ifrane. On that occa-
sion, the main roads were paved with car-
pets collected from the Beni Mguild by the
c a i d s (district officers) and their assistants.
Once the King had arrived, the reception
ceremony commenced Ð his donation of a
mosque to the town being central. Before
leaving, the King allowed men to hand him
letters in which they had worded their
preoccupations, such as lack of work.
Some days later, several herdsmen were
dissatisfied because the hunting expediti-
ons of the King near Ifrane had closed off
certain forests. Enraged, the herders set fire
to parts of the forests. As recounted by lo-
cals, the police responded by rounding up
several people in randomly selected vil-
lages, putting them into jail for several days.
In exchange for submission Ð in this case
the obligation to lend carpets and the clo-
sure of some forests Ð the population was
left with a gift and a certain degree of hope.
The belief that having the right contacts
with influential people is a precondition for
success in life is greatly cherished in Moroc-
co. Indeed, the notion of p i s t o n n e r i e ( p u l l i n g
strings) is essential in Beni Mguild culture
(and Morocco in general) and this becomes
clearly manifest in MoroccoÕs political cul-
t u r e .
Key role of the Ministry
o f t h e I n t e r i o r
Recent research shows that MoroccoÕs
state power remains very hierarchical. The
Ministry of the Interior at the provincial
level, represented by the governor, oper-
ates in an authoritarian fashion. The gover-
nor is the guardian of law and order and
therefore has a tutelle sur les collectivits lo-
cales (tutelage of local collectivities). On 9
November 1999, the dictatorial Minister of
the Interior was suspended from his office
by King Mohammed VI, but the governor
still maintains control over his territory.
Thus, he supervises the activities of the re-
gional headquarters of the line ministries
and it is at the provincial level that the
information is gathered on local conflicts.
This information is collected by the c a i d s,
themselves being informed by their assis-
tants, the sheikhs and m o q a d d e m s. By intro-
ducing a less inhibiting territorial adminis-
tration, the new King did away with almost
all governors on 31 December 1999 and ap-
pointed new officials that were more open
to communication with the population.
However, the general secretary, a crucial fig-
ure at the provincial headquarters, handles
affairs just as he used to do. His influence is
unsurpassed in the province. Each time he
passes through the provincial headquarters,
people hurriedly bow on their knees. When
he has a meeting with a c a i d, all notables
pay their respects by prostration and hand
kissing, a dramatized representation of the
obedience to authoritarian power.*
The provinceÕs tutelle sur les collectivits lo-
c a l e s continues to strike at the heart of the
local economy. The Beni MguildÕs main
source of livelihood is sheep farming on the
collectively owned pastures. It is the gover-
nor, following the instructions of the Min-
istry of the Interior, who ultimately decides
on the criteria of access. According to the
governor, people having recently settled in
the area may herd on these pastures as well
Ð a move deeply resented by several au-
tochthonous sheep farmers.
At the province hall, one can meet the im-
portant men. It is here that the develop-
ment plans of the province and how they
can fit into the national plan are decided
upon. Informally, the general secretary has
meetings with the chairmen of the district
councils, informing them on how to make
their local plans coincide with those of the
province. Once these men agree, the plan is
elaborated. The population is well aware of
the decision-making power of the province.
The sheep farmers connive with the gover-
nor by regularly sending him letters, asking
him to redress certain decisions taken by
lower authorities which they resent; secret
information about countrymen who were
their adversaries in disputes often accompa-
ny these letters, enforcing the key position
of the province in conflict resolution.
What is happening at the level of the
province is replicated at the district level.
The main function of the c a i d is to maintain
law and order in his district. However, many
disputes about access to the pastures and
other conflicts are directly put forward to
him. Especially on market days, his office is
crowded with people. Most c a i d s find great
difficulties in the straightforward handling
of affairs as they are confronted with people
who opt for other avenues to solve their
p r o b l e m s .
The sheikh and m o q a d d e m are the media-
tors between the c a i d and the population.
The former represents a clan, while the lat-
ter represents a lineage. Both are recruited
from among the local population. Despite
not receiving any compensation, many
compete for these positions because they
offer ample opportunities for self-enrich-
ment. Some may even go so far as to tattle
on other candidates in order to get into of-
fice. Because of the lack of consensus, the
village council is not able to nominate a can-
didate, leaving the appointment to be de-
cided upon at the level of the province. It is
for this reason that the population sees the
positions of sheikh and m o q a d d e m as being
equivalent to those of state representatives,
although it does not prevent them from
making deals with those in office.
Encapsulation of the elected
c o u n c i l
The district council (conseil rural) is com-
posed of elected members. Among the Beni
Mguild, most members adhere to the Mou-
vement Populaire, a conservative Berber
party. Party ideology, however, is not much
taken into consideration. The most impor-
tant factor is what a candidate can do for
the voters; therefore entire lineages act as
voting banks. 
The council has its own funds, including
the 30% added value tax it receives and in-
come from forest exploitation. By means of
a meeting, the councillors vote on the de-
velopment plan, already elaborated for
them by the province. At such a gathering,
the c a i d and technical staff of the province
are present. Should the councillors, for ex-
ample, wish to change budget allocations in
the plan, the governor has the right to veto.
But because the minutes of the meeting are
sent to the province, councillors are reluc-
tant to suggest major changes.
Part of the budget is allocated to inter-dis-
trict projects, such as a sports stadium in the
1980s and a more recent tourist complex in
Ifrane. These projects, however, were not
priorities for the local population. Part of the
budget is used to pay the staff of the district
office, with few funds remaining for small
projects, such as street cleaning. For these
reasons, the population is very dissatisfied
with the council. In addition, there is a gen-
eral belief that councillors take money from
the budget for personal use Ð a belief that
has caused great distrust.
Autochthonous institutions:
an alternative?
The Beni Mguild society is segmentary,
the minimal lineage being the smallest unit.
Formerly, this unit constituted the group
that would trek to summer camps. The max-
imal lineage often coincides with a village at
winter sites. Several lineages comprise a
clan, the members of which defend their in-
terests in larger pastures. Clans make up a
tribe, coinciding with still larger tribal areas.
Actually, now that the Beni Mguild have
sedentarized, the j e m a a (village council) has
become the most influential local power
centre. 
Within the j e m a a are the influential elders
who have the reputation of being wise.
Those known as religious men will be invit-
ed as members too. The j e m a a still runs in-
ternal village affairs such as mosque mainte-
nance and the payment of local irrigation
watchmen, and helps in organizing mar-
riages and funerals. One very important task
of the council is to elect n a i b s. The task of
each n a i b is to control access to collective
pastures and to maintain the resting period
(a g d a l) .
At a higher level, there were tribal coun-
cils composed of representatives from the
maximal lineages, which would elect a
leader by rotating among the lineages. No
longer operative, this council had the func-
tion of distributing land and water amongst
the lineages. Now sheikhs and c a i d s, ap-
pointed by the government, decide on most
m a t t e r s .
Although the j e m a a is still operative, sev-
eral factors have undermined its functions.
In the first place, there is the introduction of
party politics. Because a lineage generally
acts as a voterÕs bloc, a village cannot nomi-
nate one candidate if it consists of different
lineages. In such cases, the affair generally
ends with one part of the village feeling
underrepresented and acting accordingly.
Second, people tend to go to the c a i d if they
feel the village council has not done justice.
Members of the j e m a a frequently go to the
c a i d to look for help with a dispute.
The Berber brotherhood of the hunters
(r m a a) is still important among the Beni
Mguild. R m a a members organize the annual
visits to Berber and Arab saintsÕ shrines and
the tribal offerings in spring and in autumn.
Only men considered religious and honest
are asked to become members. Because the
r m a a members are highly respected, they
are important men in the j e m a a. But nowa-
days their importance is waning as they are
no longer respected by educated people.
The latter go directly to the c a i d or to the
court if they have a dispute.
Next to the j e m a a and the r m a a, the posi-
tion of the naib is weakening. People are
now very reluctant to accept a request of
the j e m a a to take up this post. They know
that they will be frequently invoked by the
c a i d to help in sorting out access problems,
and while the latter ultimately decides, this
decision may be contested, the n a i b r e c e i v-
ing his share of resentment. In addition,
they receive no compensation for their trou-
bles. It is thus that the Beni Mguild no
longer have an a g d a l, and the conse-
quences have, among other things, grave
ecological implications. u
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